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In his January 2020 Perspective, Orlando F. Cabrera C. submitted that the new investment 
protection regime established by the US and Mexico under the United States–Mexico–Canada 
Agreement (USMCA) represents “a new gold standard to enforce investment protection” that 
other countries should consider following. 
I disagree for two reasons. The first relates to the political genesis of the new discipline. The 
second is due to its content, both substantively (level of protection granted) and procedurally 
(instances in which recourse to direct arbitration against the host country is open).  
In both respects, Chapter 14 of UMSCA reduces drastically (and in my view erratically) the 
protection afforded to investors compared to NAFTA Chapter 11. Direct arbitration is restricted 
to US-Mexico relations, in practice in favor of US nationals investing in Mexico. Moreover, it 
is fully available for breaches of all of the substantive standards provided in the treaty only to 
investors having entered “covered governmental contracts” with either host country. Canada 
opted out from this mechanism altogether, as advocated by its civil society in light of the many 
cases in which US investors had successfully challenged Canadian restrictive measures under 
NAFTA, mainly enacted by provinces. 
Chapter 14 is the result of a novel development. The more limited protection compared to 
NAFTA does not reflect acceptance of the persistent criticism of the investment regime, 
specifically investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), expressed by certain developing countries 
circles (and UNCTAD), civil society (the “no-globals”) and some think-tanks in the north. The 
origin is the Trump administration’s novel theory that international treaty protection granted to 
US investors abroad encourages the delocalization of US companies to the detriment of US 
workers, and hence is incompatible with its “America First” policy.  
In this political context, Canada found no resistance from the US in removing ISDS. As to 
Mexico, the NAFTA-level procedural protections for US investors (i.e., full ISDS) have been 
maintained only for the big business sectors that advocated it most energetically, had the best 
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political connections and are least affected by the “American-jobs-first” policy because of their 
capital-intensive character.   
Cabrera describes well the two distinct protection regimes established under USMCA: “First, 
general investors can claim breaches only to national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment 
(only at investment’s post-establishment phase) and direct expropriation. Second, the ‘Covered 
Government Contracts’ provisions allow investors that have concluded governmental contracts 
and related activities in oil and gas, power generation, public telecommunications, public 
transportation, and certain public infrastructure to claim breaches to the above three standards 
… plus the minimum standard of treatment …, transfers, performance requirements, senior 
management, and indirect expropriation.” Based on the statistics he provides, the most 
protected investments appear to be the most capital-intensive and environment-unfriendly 
sectors (oil and gas). The least protected is manufacturing, which is the most labor-intensive 
and hence the most important to fight poverty, unemployment and workers’ exploitation in a 
developing country such as Mexico. As reported by Cabrera, “the US and Mexico decided, 
through the general investment section, to allow narrower enforcement of protections to the 
largest FDI flows from the US to Mexico. Between 1999 and 2016, manufacturing accounted 
for 49% of US FDI inflows.” 
It is difficult to understand how such a “double-standard” regime, based on purely political 
choices rather than a rational social-economic evaluation of the benefits of FDI protection, can 
be considered a “gold standard.” 
In relation to the substantive standards of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment 
and treatment according to the minimum standard of international law (which includes, under 
Article 14.6, fair-and-equitable treatment and full protection and security), there has been 
nominally no substantial innovation compared to the definition of these protections in NAFTA 
in 1994. However, as mentioned above, USMCA grants full access to direct arbitration in 
Mexico-US relations only to investors that have concluded “Covered Government Contracts” 
in certain sectors. Other, “normal” or “general” investors can resort to arbitration only in cases 
of alleged breach of the national or most-favored-nation treatment obligations, i.e., in case of 
discrimination.1 The rationale for affording effective protection on a discriminatory basis, 
depending on the mega-sector involved, is difficult to understand.2 
Where, then, to search for a “gold standard” in recent international investment agreements for 
how foreign investors should be treated, balancing their protection with host countries’ 
legitimate interests? It seems that the most innovate substantive standard is found in the 
detailed and restrictive definition (compared to the open-ended definition of “traditional” BITs) 
of fair-and-equitable treatment in Article 8.10.2 of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA). Moreover, in both CETA and the recent EU-Mexico FTA (and 
to respond to criticisms addressed to ISDS), investor-State arbitration has been replaced by a 
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